



IWT Challenge Fund Project Information

Project Reference	IWT 018
Project Title	Developing long-term law enforcement capacity to protect the Mali elephants
Country/ies	Mali, Burkina Faso
Contract Holder Institution	The WILD Foundation
Partner institutions	The Mali Government: Ministry of the Environment - La Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forets (DNEF). The US Embassy to Mali.
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Project leader name	Dr Susan Canney
Project website	http://www.wild.org/mali-elephants/
Report author(s) and date	Dr Susan Canney, 30 th April 2017

Report prepared by Dr Susan Canney (Project Leader); Dr Louis Phipps (Project UK Assistant); Nomba Ganamé (Field Manager); Idrissa Ganamé (Field Manager’s Assistant); Ibrahima Maiga (Field team’s Book-keeper); Alassane Maiga (Advisor, Government Liaison)

1. Project Rationale

The migratory desert elephants of central Mali (see map in annexe 4.1) are under severe threat from networks of international traffickers working together with local accomplices. During the conflict of 2012-2013 the elephant range was under the control of armed groups and experienced its first incidences of poaching, and post-conflict residual insecurity presents an ongoing danger.

For the first 3 years, the project was able to contain the poaching through the mobilisation of the local communities, however the ongoing insecurity required a government anti-poacher ranger force who could act on the substantial local intelligence.

Unfortunately Mali has very few foresters, training standards are poor, capacity to deal with elephant poaching is non-existent, and they have no training in working with local communities. There are few agents covering hundreds of square kilometres, living at home with no means of displacement. This is compounded by low morale and lack of belief in the value of their work, an antagonistic relationship with local communities, and a complete lack of synergy with

Terminology

Foresters – Mali does not have a separate conservation agency and so this responsibility falls to **forestiers**, government paramilitary agents mostly occupied with regulating tree use and hunting.

Anti-poaching rangers, are tasked to protect the Gourma elephants. Over the last year this has become a multi-agency unit composed of “**Gardes Forestieres**” (from the forestry service) and military personnel acting in support who have been affected to train as rangers (see text)

Brigades de surveillance now referred to as eco-guards - 600+ young, local men recruited by the project to assist in CBNRM, and report information about elephants. At the onset of conflict, their role included the detection of poaching and gathering intelligence. They are unarmed and are not salaried but rewarded with “recognition payments”.

other agents, fuelling the isolation that makes them susceptible to corruption.

This initiative aims to develop effective anti-poaching operations at field level by building on existing tried and tested approaches to create an integrated government-community anti-poaching operation. IWTC funds provide this linkage through the provision of communications, transport, and training for the ranger force; plus indirectly contribute to existing initiatives in supporting the community in standing together against poaching and the insecurity that it fosters.

Community benefit is key to the success of this approach, and existing elephant-based CBNRM activities are crucial to the success of the IWT project and vice versa – they are inter-twined. As a result local communities understand well how their fate is linked to that of the elephants: "If the elephants disappear it means the environment is no longer good for us" and "If the elephants disappear it means our area will no longer be special".

All the communities using the resources of the elephant range are affected, both resident (around 259,000 people) and seasonal. In addition to the improved security in the strategically important central region of the country, Mali will benefit through increased capacity to assure the security of its unique herd of elephants, a source of national pride, and a greater ability to protect and regenerate its biodiversity and natural resources. The international community benefits from the protection of 12% (pre-conflict) of the West African elephant population, and one of only two populations of desert-adapted elephants that instils wonder at its ability to survive.

2. Project Partnerships

The project has always worked closely with the Ministry of the Environment (MEADD) and its agency responsible for conservation, the Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forêts (DNEF). Although capacity and morale is generally very low, the project has always identified and supported competent and engaged individuals with the aim of increasing DNEF's capacity. Working with a volatile government with frequent changes of personnel is challenging but the project has developed allies over the years who enable progress to be made, albeit sometimes much more slowly than at other times.

It now works also with the Malian army, and the Ministries of Defence, of Internal Security and of Territorial Administration, and a recent Presidential directive (in response to a red alert issued by the project in annexe) has instructed the Cabinet of Ministers that all relevant government bodies and institutions to work together to conserve Mali's elephants. The project also works with the Parliamentary Committee on Wildlife who raise issues in Parliament and act as a "watch-dog".

During 2016-17 the MEP and its partners have developed a multi-agency strategy to protect Mali's elephants supported by continued community engagement through CBNRM to maintain community solidarity in the face of the insecurity and improve livelihoods through "elephant-based" wise resource use initiatives. This has resulted in the production of an updated 5-year national action plan to conserve Mali's elephants and a multi-agency protocole d'accord stipulating the operating conditions of the anti-poaching unit.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been a staunch ally and partner in securing funds together with the Canadian Embassy (\$490,000 for anti-poaching including aerial surveillance), and identifying ways in which they can support project activities, for example in making introductions, and support to training, radio-communications, and in repairing the dam at Gossi (which will help relieve livestock pressure on Banzena). The deputy head of the mission to Mali is personally engaged.

The Dutch and British Embassy have shown great interest, with the latter identifying useful contacts potential avenues of support, met with key government personnel, attended significant meetings to demonstrate international interest, and will be hosting a meeting of international partners in Mali. The US Embassy has donated equipment.

3. Project Progress

3.1 Progress in carrying out project activities

THE FUNDING SOURCE FOR EACH ACTIVITY IS INDICATED BY “IWT” OR “OTHER” IWT activities are described in fuller detail than “other” which are included for context.

Output 1: DNEF field foresters able to work with local community brigades to mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, collect and report required evidence.

Activity 1.1 . Construction, equipment and establishment of 10 additional forester posts – OTHER - Completed in 2015-16, however the deterioration in security means that the anti-poaching unit are operating out of the military bases of Hombori and Douentza until security improves.

Activity 1.2 . Deployment of 2 vehicles plus protocols of use and responsibility, under the control of the project’s field manager working in conjunction with the chefs de service - IWT

The two vehicles procured in 2015 are an invaluable part of the anti-poaching unit’s equipment, being much more manoeuvrable and quieter compared to the VLRA military vehicles (see photo in annexe), and a valuable complement to the motorbikes, greatly increasing the anti-poaching unit’s capacity. The protocol of use agreed and signed between the WILD Foundation and the DNEF has been working well. Additional work is required to ensure the required monitoring data is collected (see s.9)

Activity 1.3 . Installation of a military state-of-the-art secured radio-communications system in the most vulnerable parts of the elephant range - IWT

This is thought by all partners to be a game-changer and has encouraged others to support the project. The installation of the radio communications system was delayed for reasons described in the 2015-16 annual report (inaction by the Director of DNEF resulting in a need for Kinetic 6 to re-order the equipment, during which period the security situation deteriorated and required K6 to train a technical team in Bamako rather than complete the installation themselves. However the repeater point-to-point connector had been sent to Malawi and so the training could not cover this aspect).

The two repeater masts were installed successfully by the field team and MINUSMA made great efforts to organise a one-day helicopter drop for the 2 UK technicians in April 2016 to establish the repeater connection. This enabled the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s Deputy Special Representative at MINUSMA, and members of the Canadian embassy to view the area and the elephants. He is newly appointed and a great supporter of the fight against wildlife trafficking, and of the project.

However the connection could not be completed before the helicopter had to leave. Subsequently a power failure occurred and the repeaters stopped working. A Kinetic 6 technician travelled to the elephant range in January 2017 and completed a 3 week repair mission during which he trained local technicians and the project field team in the operation and maintenance of the communications system. However, he could not establish a link between the repeaters and once again, shortly after he departed, the system lost power and is no longer functioning. Sabotage can be discounted as one repeater site is adjacent to a military base and the other is guarded. In the interim, the APU is able to communicate using short-wave radio but the remoter areas of the elephant range (also poaching hotspots) are still not covered. It remains a priority to finalise the installation of the radio-communications system. Kinetic 6 are preparing a plan of action to enable funds to be raised for this.

Preliminary indications suggest that when operational there will be radio communications system covering the entire elephant range and beyond from the vulnerable border with Burkina Faso in the south nearly to Timbuktu and Ber in the north, and most importantly to the remote areas outside of mobile phone coverage where most of the poaching has.

Activity 1.4 . Training course and field visit to Nazinga Game Ranch in Burkina Faso for field foresters in anti-poaching procedures. OTHER - Completed 2015-2016

Activity 1.5 . *Training of field foresters in working with local communities as part of community activities and ongoing monitoring of performance. OTHER* - A training manual was developed in 2015-16

Activity 1.6 . *Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance. OTHER*

Chengeta Wildlife was selected to deliver anti-poaching training- due to the value that they place upon effective community engagement and intelligence-led, tactics and operational procedures that include the key skills of combat tracking adapted to the needs of anti-poaching. These foster community engagement and minimise risk to the rangers. In April 2016 Rory Young of Chengeta Wildlife completed a needs assessment of ranger competence and the anti-poaching strategy as a whole. A core unit of 15 of the most capable DNEF rangers was selected for advanced anti-poaching training led by Rory Young and other specialist trainers in July – September but only 6 were deemed of sufficient quality. Sweeping changes in personnel from the Minister to the Chef de Cantonnement, together with the engagement of the Head of the Malian Armed Forces (Chef d’Etat Major General des Armees) enabled the APU to be reformed with the 6 DNEF rangers supplemented by 30 of Mali’s best soldiers. The unit performed to high standards during 10 weeks of advanced in-operations training between November 2016 and March 2017.

In total 17 weeks (119 days) of training were delivered by Chengeta Wildlife in 2016-17. This included 2 days of human rights training from MINUSMA. Throughout all training activities an emphasis has been placed upon the importance of working with local communities sensitively and effectively, and the importance of gathering, analysing and acting upon intelligence provided by local.

Output 2: DNEF at commune, cercle and regional levels able to support ground operations, deliver effective anti-poaching and trafficking operations, collect and keep required data.

The delay in ranger deployment, the escalation in poaching from the beginning of 2015 and the dysfunction in DNEF meant that none of the activities associated with this output were appropriate as all focus had to be on the deployment of rangers (output 1) and the containment of the poaching.

Activity 2.1 . *Training course and field visit to Niokolo-Koba National Park in Senegal for DNEF at commune, cercle and regional levels in supporting the field operations.*

Replaced through a Change Request by:

Activity 2.1. *Two large community meetings (one for each cercle) of all the mayors, security forces, local government and administration to gather and share information on the poaching issue, create community solidarity around the poaching issue and make a public declaration that will be disseminated locally and by national media. IWT*

Completed in November 2015 in response to the sudden reappearance of poaching and resulted in a three minute “TV Spot” on prime time national TV; and a delegation of 5 mayors was received by the Prime Minister to deliver a letter explaining the links between elephant conservation, local livelihoods and security (see 2015-16 annual report)

Activity 2.2 . *Ongoing monitoring of performance to assess take-up and identify further training needs.* - This is a continual activity as the project seeks results (see section 9).

Activity 2.3 . *Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance. UNDER REVIEW*

Activity 2.4 . *Trialling the Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic toolkit, and the CITES and EIA guides for enforcement officers to determine the best way for enforcement officers to make use of these tools. UNDER REVIEW*

The project is working with bilateral partners to create offices concerned with (a) information analysis to provide intelligence and (b) judicial outcomes. Significant progress is expected in Y2.

Output 3: Effective forester presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso.

Activity 3.1 . Meeting, training course and exchange to establish community-forester anti-poaching systems with cross-border co-operation and integration of poaching response. OTHER - Completed in April 2015 (see 2015-16 annual report).

Activity 3.2 . Follow-up meetings to assess progress, learn lesson - OTHER

Two follow-up meetings held in the Malian and Burkina sides of the cross-border region in July 2015 (see 2015-16 annual report)

In 2016-17 armed groups infiltrated the Mali-Burkina border region and increased their rate of attack. To maintain community solidarity to fight anti-poaching the project held two 2-day inter-communal meetings attended by 145 representatives from trans-frontier communities in May and September. Community leaders continued to voice their support for anti-poaching operations and denounced the poachers as thieves, calling for renewed efforts to restore security. In August and September 11 days of training were delivered for eco-guardians from cross-border communities in how to monitor elephants and report poaching-related activities safely, discretely and effectively; and in response to increased poaching in October, the 12 most capable and trustworthy eco-guardians from southern communities were trained to work with the APU.

Since the APU became fully operational in February, opportunities to interact with the trans-frontier communities have been limited because the elephants have mainly been located in the centre and north of the range, following their usual migratory pattern (see annexe).

3.2 Progress towards project Outputs

Output 1: DNEF anti-poaching rangers able to work with local community brigades to mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, collect and report required evidence.

Training began in May 2016 but the APU was not fully operational until February 2017. During the intervening period the Malian military completed patrols in response to poaching and human-elephant conflict incidents in Indamane and N'gaw-N'gaw in May and Inadiatafane in November. The new APU began its in-operations training in November but was not confident to go into the poaching hotspots (highly insecure) without the trainers until after the second training session in February when they avoided 4 attempts to blow them up by jihadist IEDs. They now routinely travel in these zones and are proud of their achievement (but need to guard against complaisance). This has caused a stir within Mali, as no militaries have travelled to many of these areas since 2012, and are frequently victim to attack while travelling along roads.

The APU was able to respond to intelligence on recent poaching incidents on 7 additional occasions, including 5 responses during in-operations training from December-March, however the information was already 2 days old when they received it. This represents a significant increase in response rate compared to 2015-16 and the aim is for all new poaching incidents to be responded to from Q1 of 2017-18.

Information / intelligence gathering: Since becoming fully operational and working closely with the communities, the APU has gathered some important information. A robust system to collect, collate, analyse and act on poaching-related intelligence will be established in 2017-18 with support from multiple partners.

Indicator 1.1. Number of manned forester posts in the elephant range (baseline = 4; end point = 14). 5 new fixed forester posts constructed and 5 mobile posts established in 2015 (though not operational until the security situation improves) see activity 1.1.

Indicator 1.2. Number of foresters deployed throughout the elephant range (baseline = 4; endpoint = 30). 36 rangers operational in anti-poaching unit: 6 from DNEF and 30 from the Malian army. 4 foresters deployed in forester posts. (see activities above)

Indicator 1.3. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero). 17 weeks (119 days) of training from Chengeta Wildlife in 2016-17, including 10 weeks of advanced in-operations training from November 2016-March 2017 (see activities above)

Indicator 1.4. Number of incidences of poaching detected (baseline = 12 in six months); DNEF response mounted (baseline = 7 in six months) = 7, arrests follow (baseline = 7 in six months) = 0, information about instigator/trafficker obtained (baseline=7 in six months) .

These baselines were determined in 2014 before the sudden escalation of poaching and decrease in security in 2015 (see graph in annexe). 44 (/ month) elephants were killed April 2016 – Mar 2017. This represents a % decrease compared to the same period in 2015-16 (76 elephants; 6per year). From Apr-Sep 2016 only 9 elephants were killed (/ month) by poachers which represents the lowest level of poaching since the escalation in 2015 (2014-15 rate = / month). From October the poaching rate increased, with 35 elephants killed by poachers, with peaks in October in the south-east of the range (14 killed) and January in the north of the range (9 killed). Since the APU became fully operational in February no elephants have been poached (see graph in annexe).

Output 2: DNEF at commune, cercle and regional levels able to support ground operations, deliver effective anti-poaching and trafficking operations, collect and keep required data.

The priority for 2016-17 was to mobilize the APU on the ground in order to provide an effective response to the escalation in poaching. This has been achieved but needs to be maintained. The focus is now on the higher levels of the DNEF and other government agencies but the way to deliver this has changed (due to the changing circumstances described elsewhere). Once the working draft of the doctrine is disseminated for discussion in Y3, a workshop will be held for the relevant personnel at commune, cercle and regional levels to ensure they are aware of their responsibilities.

The baselines below were established in 2014 before the escalation in poaching, deterioration in security and change in leadership at DNEF. See further discussion in activities 2.2 - 2.4

- Indicator 2.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero). *Zero*
- Indicator 2.2. Number and percentage of poaching incidences that result in arrest in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = 4, 33% in six months). *Zero*
- Indicator 2.3. Number and percentage of poaching incidences that result in prosecution in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline=zero). *Zero*

Output 3: Effective forester presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso.

The elephants have not been in the border region since the APU became operational in February 2017.

- Indicator 3.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 provided to community brigades and foresters from the south of the elephant range and Burkina Faso (baseline=zero). *At least 2 weeks (duration not recorded for two of the training courses)*
- Indicator 3.2. Number of incidences of coordinated action (baseline=zero). *Zero*

3.3 Progress towards the project Outcome

Intended outcome: Mali has an improved capacity to co-ordinate activities in tracking and tracing elephant poaching, bringing poachers to justice and enforcing poaching laws. This will halt the current escalation of poaching by severely impeding the operation of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking networks in Mali, and thereby maintain elephant numbers. The increased government capacity will feed in to support local systems of resource management that improve livelihoods and make space for elephants, while increasing security.

Progress towards outcome during Year 2: Despite the worsening security situation (as measured by indicator 6), the delay in funds from multiple sources, and the dysfunction within DNEF, the project has managed to find ways to reduce the escalation in poaching through working with communities, the military and forging new partnerships. Since February 2017, the anti-poaching unit has been operational in areas that have seen no government, military (of any kind) or enforcement agencies since 2012; and startling the bandits and extremist groups that have held sway during this time by appearing in one place on one day and then another place many miles away the next. This is a testament to the quality of Chengeta's commitment,

doctrine and training; as well as engagement at the top of the military and the quality of the men comprising the second incarnation of the anti-poaching unit. The improved capacity is measured by the absence of poaching since the unit has been fully operational and the evidence of their trajectory across the zone. The Deputy Head of the MINUSMA has stated that this is the only body that is operating and able to achieve anything on the ground and “the whole mission is talking about it”.

The vehicles are invaluable but it has been disappointing not to have the radio-communications system fully operational.

The project has a good chance of achieving this outcome at field level if money can continue to be raised to support their training and mentoring (as well as bonuses for working in a highly dangerous area). This is particularly the case with the need to rotate the military elements of the anti-poaching unit.

The process of constituting a multi-agency response has required strong commitment at high levels (as documented in section 12), and helps provide the sustained engagement required to overcome challenges within DNEF. The project is active in engaging partners to help achieve the outcome (see activity 2.4).

Indicators:

- Indicator 1. Number of elephant illegally killed and rate of increase/decrease in killings compared to existing rate, aiming for no further increase within the project period (baseline = 12 in six months). *See graph in annexe for elephants killed since poaching began in 2012, and output indicator 1.4.*
- Indicator 2. Number of illegal killings for which the perpetrators are arrested, and brought to justice, the instigator identified and arrested, the trafficker identified, and the tusks recovered, in order to map out the existing trafficking network within the project period (baseline = 4 arrests and prosecutions in six months of individuals thought to be responsible for several killings; instigator, informant and suspected trafficker identified). *Zero due to the factors explained earlier*
- Indicator 3. Extension of forester field presence – the creation and equipment of 10 additional forester posts throughout the elephant range. *Achieved however not in use. The APU operates out of military bases*
- Indicator 4. Development of a cross-border capacity for co-operation in anti-poaching operations. *See output 3, activities 3.1 and 3.2*
- Indicator 5. Increased support to local communities in resource management (baseline = 1 per annum). *Not applicable – this indicator relates to output 4, which has been removed subject to a change request*
- Indicator 6. A reduction in number of hijackings and robberies assumed to be correlated with number of attacks to government targets. The Long War Journal records the following number of attacks to government targets: 2014=0; 2015=4; 2016 = 44; 2017 to March =18; demonstrating the deterioration in security.

3.4 Monitoring of assumptions

Outcome level assumptions:

Assumption 1. Increased enforcement capacity leads to reduced poaching incidences.

Comments: So far this does seem to be the case, given that there has been no poaching since the APU became fully operational.

Assumption 2. Mali remains committed to supporting the enforcement of its laws on poaching.

Comments: The 5-year action plan and the protocol d'accord suggest that Mali is committed to this, as does the Presidential directive, although there have not yet been any prosecutions for poaching.

Assumption 3. Trafficking networks can be deterred from targeting ivory. Comments: Identities of at least some of the poachers have been discovered and they are indeed part of trafficking

networks. The reduction in poaching since February suggests deterrence, although this may return as poachers shift their tactics.

Output level assumptions:

Assumption 1. That civil war does not reoccur and government remains in the elephant range.

Comments: This is an unknown as it depends on the actions of several actors. The number of attacks has increased however there also appears to be increasing commitment from peacekeeping and other forces to increase presence and active operations in the central region.

Assumption 2. That all levels of the DNEF remain committed to elephant protection.

Comments: This is a key assumption. All levels are not committed to elephant protection but to date enough key individuals of sufficient seniority have been mobilised to oblige the others to follow suit.

Assumption 3. Greater capacity to respond prevents an increase in poaching incidents.

Comments: This does seem to be valid. The poaching rate has been reduced to zero since the deployment of the APU however it is still early days.

Assumption 4. That DNEF contains staff turnover to ensure a corpus of personnel develop an elephant protection ethic that is strong enough to be transmitted to subsequent officers.

Comments: The new anti-poaching plan makes provision for military turnover as requested by the military, and the protocols together with the multi-agency anti-poaching committee makes provision for inter-agency discussion on optimal staff deployment.

4. Impact: achievement of positive impact on illegal wildlife trade and poverty alleviation

Original impact stated in logframe: A reduction in elephant poaching, an increase in security, and poverty alleviation in the Gourma region of Mali.

Impact on illegal wildlife trade: Poaching has decreased by 42% compared with the same period of the previous year and there has been no poaching since the APU was fully operational in February 2017. The project is working with partners to create an anti-poaching analysis and prosecutions unit, closely co-ordinated with existing anti-trafficking initiatives.

Impact on poverty alleviation: See section 7

5. Project support to the IWT Challenge Fund Objectives and commitments under the London Declaration and Kasane Statement

The project contributes to:

1. Developing sustainable livelihoods for communities affected by illegal wildlife trade, as described in sections 4, 7, and 8.
2. Strengthening law enforcement and the role of the criminal justice system through the creation of a government anti-poaching system from scratch, beginning with an anti-poaching ranger force in the elephant range, and working with bilateral partners to involve the other relevant government enforcement agencies.

Notable achievements: the sudden break-through and rapid transition from a seemingly hopeless situation to a high-performing, operational unit that has everyone in the UN mission talking about their ability to operate where no other militaries have been able to.

6. Impact on species in focus

The project has prevented the complete decimation of this elephant population by braking the sudden escalation witnessed in 2015 that resulted from a decrease in security, a new targeting of the local population by international trafficking networks, and the change in leadership at DNEF. This has been through the efforts to engage multiple partners and work simultaneously at local, national and international levels.

The poaching rate has decreased by 42% in the last year compared to the previous year and since the APU became fully operational since February no elephants have been poached (see output 1 indicator 1.4 and graph/maps in annexe).

7. Project support to poverty alleviation

In providing a model for how to operate in this highly insecure zone, the IWT project not only potentially improves the physical security of the 165,650 population of the elephant range, but also those in the surrounding hinterland. This is required for the local people to conduct their lives without threat of theft or attack, and to enable them to travel without fear of hijack. Engaging international and national partners has brought more attention to the role of conservation in promoting stabilisation.

Throughout all anti-poaching training activities an emphasis has been placed upon the importance of working with local communities sensitively and effectively. The unit includes a medic who administers health support to local people who had not received any health care for years and gathers important information about poaching-related activity and the movements of elephants. They also keep a record of those treated (averaging 75 per village see annex). As a result, the APU has been called “l’armée gentille” (kind army) and provided an additional incentive for protecting the elephants and their habitats.

The existence of the APU supports community efforts in elephant protection and elephant-based CBNRM that provides benefits to local communities for protecting elephants. These are multiple (see <http://www.wild.org/blog/why-do-the-local-people-protect-the-elephants/>). Elephants provide a vital value-based focus for these activities that applies to all regardless of power or wealth. Protecting the elephants ensures the continuation of the elephant-based CBNRM that improves local livelihoods, food security, and well-being by empowering local communities (through improved local governance) to come together to control over-exploitation and reverse degradation that has resulted from a lack of commonly-agreed and respected systems of resource management. Improved ecosystem services and resilience result in more and better pasture and forest resources. The project also engages communities to rationalise water management to improve water security in key areas and reduce the incidence of water-borne disease where this is an issue. It also builds social cohesion which is not only vital for effective resource management but also for healing the social wounds opened up by the conflict and promoting social resilience.

8. Consideration of Gender equity issues

This IWT project impacts gender equity issues indirectly through supporting the security required for local livelihoods; and its CBNRM activities, some of which are particularly targeted at helping women with the revenue-generation activities based on CBNRM, such as the marketing of NTFPs which provide more income than forest cutting and clearance for charcoal (the subject of a Darwin Initiative project). Women and children always suffer most in conflict zones and the APU provides medical treatment for the communities it passes through, many of which have seen no government presence since 2012.

9. Monitoring and evaluation

The Project Director monitors overall progress and plans the implementation of project initiatives through daily reports and discussions with the Field Manager. The Field Manager is supported by a small all-Malian field team led by two technicians who assist with training, logistics, community liaison and gathering field data. The vast area of operation means that regular reports to the APU and field team from community members are essential. The community eco-guardians form an extensive monitoring network to provide important information on elephant movements, poaching-related activity and abusive use of natural resources. These are tasks that they enjoy and are an important part of community engagement. The field data are collated by the field team and sent by email or online data storage to the monitoring officer in the UK who is responsible for verifying and analysing the data and creating reports for the Project Director on a monthly basis. This flow of information through the chain of communication from the communities, the APU and the field team back to the UK project team enables assessments of project initiatives and informs short- and long-term strategic planning. It is an ongoing challenge to ensure that datasheets are completed consistently by some individuals and sent on time, but this is improving and the field team have done some excellent work in difficult circumstances. This is an aspect of the project that has been prioritized for improvement to complement the field team’s sound understanding of the milieu.

Anti-poaching unit (APU) monitoring: The establishment of the anti-poaching unit as an official government entity has been coordinated by the Project Director and Field Manager, with guidance and support from the project's Adviser to the Minister of the Environment, as well as project partners such as MINUSMA and Chengeta Wildlife.

The performance of the APU is monitored by the Chengeta Wildlife trainers (led by Rory Young) based on levels of discipline, commitment, and anti-poaching and patrol skills (e.g. tracking; proactive and reactive investigation; community liaison; intelligence gathering). After each training session the APU is debriefed in the field, and higher level DNEF, FAMA and MINUSMA personnel are debriefed in Bamako. The Project Director and Field Manager are present at the higher level debriefs, enabling regular reviews and effective planning of future strategies.

Securing monitoring data (both operations and technical) from the APU has been challenging but progress has been made, rising from a baseline of no reports to records of routes taken and people given medical treatment. The aim is to monitor patrol effort, response rate, arrest rate and their impact on the elephant poaching rate, and datasheets have been modified to facilitate the process however a Cybertracker system will be introduced in Y2 which will hopefully improve APU monitoring capacity. This will also feed into a system to collect, collate, analyse and act on intelligence relating to poaching networks. The deployment of the aerial support unit in Q2-Q3 will also increase the capacity to monitor elephant movements and respond to recent or live poaching incidents.

The field team continue to work hard under challenging circumstances to meet monitoring requirements at the same time as implementing critical project activities.

10. Lessons learnt

The project is continually monitoring and learning given the highly changeable and unpredictable situation which requires continual creative adaptation; and the need to operate as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. Learning is built into the methodology and approach whereby activities are trialled on a small scale and modified before launching on a larger scale. The development of the APU is a good example of adapting to the socio-political context. Another example is now keeping the operation of eco-guards separate from the APU since the resurgent jihadist occupation of the area that intensified during 2016, for their own safety; and for the APU to develop its own informant networks.

Key to success are competent field operatives using a doctrine that combines principles of community conservation with intelligence-driven arrest and deterrence operations. Technology is no substitute: it is a tool.

Things that have worked well include: developing partnerships with MINUSMA, the Malian army and the Parliamentary working group; engaging local communities; finding appropriate partners to provide ranger training and an aerial surveillance package.

Things that did not work well include the glacial progress in the deployment of the APU and the initial training due to the absence of/obstructive leadership within DNEF. However this experience provided the concrete evidence required for sweeping personnel change and a complete-turnaround to rapidly produce an operational APU that the trainer says is the most competent anti-poaching unit he has trained in the 12 African countries in which he has worked.

It is difficult to see what could have been done differently given the constraints and the ever-changing, unpredictable nature of the situation.

11. Actions taken in response to previous reviews (if applicable) N/A

12. Other comments on progress not covered elsewhere

There has been an increase in armed attacks by jihadist groups against Malian military, government, UN, NGO and civilian personnel and equipment, particularly since September 2016 (see reports in annexe). Mali is currently the UN's most dangerous peace-keeping mission. In addition the APU was initially extremely reluctant to venture into the Tuareg north of the elephant range, which coincides with the poaching hotspots.

The total absence of any interest, action or engagement from the Director of DNEF until October 2016 was an enormous problem and hamstrung everything: not only the progress of

the re-drafting of the reserve text but also the deployment of the ranger force. DNEF is a para-military directorate and everything has to pass by the Director. The made moving forward extremely difficult and required much more effort for activities that are ultimately the responsibility of government, such as legislation and anti-poaching response. However the evaluation report of the ranger training enabled an intense learning process for the government and, together with the replacement of the Minister, led to the replacement of the Director of DNEF at the end of September, and the situation has been transformed. The recruitment of a previous Director as the project's government liaison officer has been invaluable in navigating these waters.

The evolution of the APU has required an enormous level of government engagement. With sweeping changes to Ministry personnel in October 2016 (Minister, Secretary General, Director of DNEF, Chef de Cantonnement, leadership of the APU), the new Minister convened a high-level workshop on the current situation. The project needed to lead on the following:

- A briefing document for the meeting
- A five-year plan for elephant conservation (with log-frames, programmes and budgets, allocated to MEP and government) requested by the Minister at the meeting
- A draft protocole d'accord between the Malian military, DNEF and WILD Foundation as a basis for discussion which was then modified by the other partners. This set out how the new APU would operate. The military were keen but the signature was delayed by the new Director of DNEF being reluctant to sign. He left after a few months to take up another post.
- A red-alert to government with graphs showing the population projections if nothing was done and text that hinted at the key causes; and identifying what needed to be done. This was aimed at advancing the signature of the protocol and was presented at the cabinet meeting. It resulted in a directive from the President to the Cabinet of Ministers for all relevant agencies to work together to ensure elephant protection.

This series of documents has greatly strengthened government engagement. At the same time rendering this unit operational has meant its operations can be used to demonstrate what is required to higher levels within DNEF and the military. This has been a much more effective training method and will be consolidated by a workshop that covers the responsibilities of each implicated party at each level.

The delayed release of funds for this grant and the new Darwin Initiative grant unfortunately coincided with substantial delays by many months in the release of funds from other funding partners (UN agencies). This unfortunate coincidence caused huge problems, as project activities risked losing momentum (and therefore requiring even more funds to re-establish) and the confidence/trust of the local people.

13. Sustainability and legacy

The project enjoys high profile in Mali, within the government, MINUSMA (*"everybody is talking about it in the mission"*), and certain embassies. Because the project works closely with government the Minister is very well briefed and the project provides a high level of technical support to the MEADD and DNEF in planning and management. In the last year the project has written 9 briefings on the insecurity and risk of poaching, and one extended red-alert to government in February which resulted in the President issuing a directive to the government to ensure elephant protection (see section 3.1 output 5) The planned exit strategy is still the same.

The achievements of the past year, particularly in creating a five-year plan for the elephants and a tri-partite protocole d'accord signed by the Head of the Armed Forces and the Director of DNEF greatly demonstrate strengthened commitment within the Mali Government's.

14. IWF Challenge Fund Identity

The project acknowledges the contribution of the IWT Challenge fund and uses the UK Government Aid logo on all presentations and papers, and in all engagements with the Malian government and international agencies in particular. All articles recognise the role of project partners with a hyperlink to a [page](#) where the UK aid logo is amongst the most prominent. It is listed as a major donor/partner. It requests this acknowledgement in all media pieces although

this is not always respected. The logo was going to be painted on the doors of the anti-poaching vehicles although this was not thought to be a good idea as it might attract jihadist attack.

15. Project Expenditure

Table 1 Project expenditure during the reporting period (April 2016-March 2017)

Project spend (indicative) since last annual report	2016/17 Grant (£)	2016/17 Total actual IWT Costs (£)	Variance %	Comments (please explain significant variances)
Staff costs (see below) Lead staff: <i>Project Officer</i> Partner staff: <i>Anti-poaching officer</i> <i>Advisor to Minister of Env.</i> <i>Community liaison assistant</i>				
Consultancy costs				
Overhead Costs				
Travel and subsistence				
Operating Costs				
Capital items (see below)				
Others (see below)				
TOTAL				

16. **OPTIONAL: Outstanding achievements of your project during the reporting period (300-400 words maximum). This section may be used for publicity purposes**

I agree for the IWT Secretariat to publish the content of this section

Outstanding achievements include the deployment of a competent anti-poaching unit from scratch into zones so insecure that no militaries of any kind are able to deploy in these zones. This is discussed in more detail in the following brief article published on the National Geographic "A Voice for Elephants" blog

<http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/07/ground-breaking-initial-success-in-protecting-malis-elephants-but-it-must-be-sustained/>

The obstacles have been enormous (see s. 12) including a further decrease in security and intensification in jihadist infiltration, an absence of leadership or engagement at national and local levels of DNEF, and the coincidence of funding delays of several months by multiple funders.

In addition the field team has continued to work in the zone through intelligent adaptation, for example using scruffy motorbikes to travel to insecure zones and never staying the night.

Despite all these huge challenges, the poaching rate, and the 42% reduction in the poaching rate compared to 2015-16 is a significant achievement.

Annex 1: Report of progress and achievements against Logical Framework for Financial Year 2015-2016

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Progress and Achievements: April 2016 - March 2017.	Actions required/planned for next period
<p>Impact</p> <p>A reduction in elephant poaching, an increase in security, and poverty alleviation in the Gourma region of Mali.</p>		<p>There has been a 42% decrease in poaching over the past year despite a worsening security situation and insurgency; and no poaching since the APU was fully operational in February. The anti-poaching unit (APU) works with communities helping them and providing medical treatment, and who are known by the local people as "l'armee gentile". Very many areas have seen no sign of government for 5 years, and the APU are welcomed as a sign of government presence in the surrounding lawlessness. Their presence also supports community efforts to protect elephants and conduct elephant-based CBNRM, a focus of a Darwin Initiative project.</p>	
<p>Outcome</p> <p>Mali has in improved capacity to coordinate activities in tracking and tracing elephant poaching, bringing poachers to justice and enforcing poaching laws. This will halt the current escalation of poaching by severely impeding the operation of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking networks in Mali, and thereby maintain elephant numbers. The increased government capacity will feed in to support local systems of resource management that improve livelihoods and make space for elephants, while increasing security.</p>	<p>1. Number of elephant illegally killed and rate of increase/decrease in killings compared to existing rate, aiming for no further increase within the project period (baseline = 12 in six months).</p>	<p>1. Total number of elephants killed April 2016 – Mar 2017 = 44 (3.67±4.92 / month). This represents a 42% decrease compared to the same period in 2015-16 (76 elephants; 6.33±7.91 per year). From Apr-Sep 2016 only 9 elephants were killed (1.5±1.8 / month) by poachers which represents the lowest level of poaching since the escalation in 2015 (2014-15 rate = 2.83±3.51 / month). From October the poaching rate increased, with 35 elephants killed by poachers, with peaks in October in the south-east of the range (14 killed) and January in the north of the range (9 killed). Since the APU became fully operational at</p>	<p>General Actions:</p> <p>i. Advanced in-operations training by Chengeta Wildlife trainers will continue in 2017-18, with five 2-week training sessions scheduled from May until December. Over the course of this period, an additional 72 personnel will be trained in advanced anti-poaching techniques, with five training sessions scheduled between each Chengeta session – during these sessions the existing 36-man APU will train new team members during regular operations after they complete initial training with Chengeta trainers. This will result in 108 personnel being trained in advanced anti-poaching</p>

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Progress and Achievements: April 2016 - March 2017.	Actions required/planned for next period
	<p>2. Number of illegal killings for which the perpetrators are arrested, and brought to justice, the instigator identified and arrested, the trafficker identified, and the tusks recovered, in order to map out the existing trafficking network within the project period (baseline = 4 arrests and prosecutions in six months of individuals thought to be responsible for several killings; instigator, informant and suspected trafficker identified).</p> <p>3. Extension of forester field presence – the creation and equipment of 10 additional ranger posts throughout the elephant range.</p> <p>4. Development of a cross-border capacity for co-operation in anti-poaching operations.</p> <p>5. Increased support [from DNEF foresters] to local communities in resource management (baseline = 4 per annum)–No longer applicable as related to output 4 which was removed through a change request</p> <p>6. A reduction in number of hijackings and robberies assumed to be correlated with number of attacks to government targets. <i>Modified indicator:</i> details and locations of armed attacks published on the Long War Journal database by Caleb Weiss are more indicative of the overall security situation in the Gourma.</p>	<p>the end of January no elephants have been poached (Annex – maps and graph).</p> <p>2. Zero as identities of poachers discovered but no evidence that would justify an arrest and prosecution. This target was made in 2014 before the sudden deterioration in security in 2015.</p> <p>3. 10 posts created but insecurity means the APU operates from military bases and sleeps in irregular mobile camps to avoid detection and ambush.</p> <p>4. Cross-border co-ordination created in 2015-16 maintained through two 2-day inter-communal meetings attended by 145 representatives from trans-frontier communities in May and September (see output 3 below) In August and September 11 days of training were facilitated for eco-guardians from cross-border communities, including a 2-day training workshop for 58; but no elephants have been poached in these areas.</p> <p>5.</p> <p>6. The security situation in central Mali has deteriorated during 2016-17. The Long War Journal database and unpublished data from Caleb Weiss indicate the following numbers of attacks in the elephant range: 2014=0; 2015=4; 2016 = 40; 2017 (Jan-Mar) = 18 (see map in annexe). Also reports:</p>	<p>operations and enable a 36-man APU to be operating throughout the year</p> <p>ii. The anti-poaching aircraft will be shipped to Mali in Q1 of 2017-18 and pilot and mechanic training will run from Q2, with deployment of aerial support expected in Q3. This element of the APU is funded in full by MINUSMA.</p> <p>iii. Continued collaboration with intelligence, anti-trafficking and judicial reform agencies working in the country.</p> <p>iv. Creation of the multi-agency committee on anti-poaching and a workshop for all <i>responsables</i>.</p> <p>v. Continue supporting trans-frontier communities in elephant protection and CBNRM initiatives.</p> <p>vi. A system to monitor patrol effort and gather intelligence/information during APU patrols is currently under development, based on a CyberTracker/SMART interface, to be tested in Q1-Q2 of 2017-18.</p> <p>vii. Develop a robust system to collect, collect, analyse and respond to poaching-related intelligence with support from multiple partners.</p>

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Progress and Achievements: April 2016 - March 2017.	Actions required/planned for next period
		UN report , Crisis Group report	
<p>Output 1. DNEF field foresters able to work with local community brigades to mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, collect and report required evidence.</p>	<p>1.1. Number of manned forester posts in the elephant range (baseline = 4; end point = 14).</p> <p>1.2. Number of foresters (including rangers) deployed throughout the elephant range (baseline = 4; endpoint = 30).</p> <p>1.3. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero).</p> <p>1.4. Number of incidences of poaching detected (baseline = 12 in six months), DNEF response mounted (baseline = 7 in six months), arrests follow (baseline = 7 in six months), information about instigator/trafficker obtained (baseline=7 in six months).</p>	<p>1.1. Complete – refer to AR 2015-16. Total forester posts = 14</p> <p>1.2. A 36-man mixed-agency anti-poaching unit is now fully operational and regularly conducting patrols throughout the elephant range, including the insecure north where there has been no government presence for 5 years. Continued training of personnel as they continue to rotate.</p> <p>1.3. The APU received 17 weeks (119 days) of training from Chengeta Wildlife in 2016-17, including 10 weeks of advanced in-operations training from November 2016-March 2017 when the unit was reformed into a multi-agency unit of 30 military and 5 foresters. This included 2 days of human rights and community liaison training from MINUSMA.</p> <p>1.4. <i>Poaching</i>: Refer to outcome 1 progress above. In 2016-17 there was a 42% reduction in the number of elephants killed (44 killed in 21 incidents) compared to the same period in 2015-16 (76 killed). <i>DNEF response</i>: The APU was not fully operational until February 2017. During the intervening period the Malian military completed patrols in response to poaching in Indamane and N'gaw-N'gaw in May and Inadiatafane in November. From September the APU was able to respond to intelligence on recent poaching incidents on 7 additional occasions, including 5 responses during in-operations training from December-March. This represents a significant increase in response rate compared to 2015-16 and the aim is for all new poaching incidents to be responded to from Q1 of 2017-18. <i>Information / intelligence gathering</i>: Since becoming fully operational and working closely with the communities, the APU has gathered significant amounts of important information which will be fed into an intelligence analysis system hopefully established in Y2 with support from multiple partners.</p>	
<p>Activity 1.1. Construction, equipment and establishment of 10 additional forester posts for use by anti-poaching rangers. Not funded by IWTC funds.</p>		<p>The new forester posts – 5 fixed and 5 mobile - were completed on schedule by the end of June 2015. The APU currently operates from military bases and uses irregular mobile camps while on patrol to avoid detection and ambush.</p>	
<p>Activity 1.2. Deployment of 2 vehicles plus protocols of use and responsibility, under the control of the project's field manager working in conjunction with the chefs de service. Funded by IWTC funds.</p>		<p><u>This is an activity funded by IWTC funds.</u> Two vehicles were procured and in place by the end of June 2015, as scheduled.</p>	
<p>Activity 1.3. Installation of a military state-of-the-art secured radio-communications system in the most vulnerable parts of the elephant range. Funded by IWTC funds.</p>		<p><u>This is an activity funded by IWTC funds.</u> The radio-communications system is still not operational due to difficulties reported previously. In April a MINUSMA helicopter operation transported specialist technicians from Kinetic 6 to the</p>	

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Progress and Achievements: April 2016 - March 2017.	Actions required/planned for next period
		<p>repeater sites on the escarpments to establish the microwave link between the two repeater masts. Unfortunately the strict time constraints meant there was not sufficient time and the system subsequently suffered from power failure. In May a local technician visited both repeaters and suggested that the batteries and power supply were not sufficient to power the installed system. Subsequently, a Kinetic 6 technician travelled to the elephant range in January under a 30 strong armed guard and completed a 3 week repair and training mission. Unfortunately once again the system lost power again shortly after he departed and is no longer functioning. In the interim, the APU is able to communicate using existing short-wave radio networks, but it remains a priority to finalise the installation of the radio-communications system.</p>	
<p>Activity 1.4. Training course and field visit to Nazinga Game Ranch in Burkina Faso for field foresters in anti-poaching procedures. Not funded by IWTC funds.</p>		<p>Completed in March 2016. Please refer to AR 2015-16 for additional details.</p>	
<p>Activity 1.5. Training of field foresters in working with local communities as part of community activities and ongoing monitoring of performance. Not funded by IWTC funds.</p>		<p>A training manual was produced in 2015; they received 2-days human rights training from MINUSMA, and how to work with communities is an integral part of their training from Chengeta</p>	
<p>Activity 1.6. Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance.</p>		<p>Refer to output indicator 1.3 progress above. A total of 17 weeks (119 days) of training were provided to the APU in 2016-17. Five 2-week sessions of training by Chengeta Wildlife are planned from May-December 2017. Before each of these, 12 or 6 men will be rotated in and taught basic military skills by the rest of the team so that Chengeta can focus on anti-poaching training.</p>	
<p>Output 2. DNEF at commune, cercle and regional levels able to support ground operations, deliver effective anti-poaching and trafficking operations, collect and keep required data.</p>	<p>2.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero) replaced by a change request for Two large community meetings for mayors, security forces, local government and administration</p> <p>2.2. Number and percentage of poaching incidences that result in arrest in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = 4, 33% in six months in 2015).</p> <p>2.3. Number and percentage of poaching incidences that result in prosecution in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline=zero).</p>	<p>2.1. Completed in 2015.</p> <p>The delay in ranger deployment, the escalation in poaching from the beginning of 2015 and the dysfunction in DNEF meant that so far indicators 2.2 and 2.3 are zero. The APU was only fully operational since February and all information on poaching incidents arrived 2 days after the incident due to the need to walk to areas with phone signal.</p> <p>The priority for 2016-17 was to mobilize the APU on the ground in order to provide an effective response to poaching incidents. It has proved a very effective training tool for higher levels of the army and DNEF. With the signature of the protocol, the creation of a multi-agency committee and the completion of the first draft of the doctrine, there will be a workshop to discuss the doctrine and ensure that higher levels are aware of their responsibilities. At the same time the project is working with bilateral partners to establish intelligence analysis and judicial outcomes offices.</p>	

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Progress and Achievements: April 2016 - March 2017.	Actions required/planned for next period
Activity 2.1. Two large community meetings (one for each cercle) of all the mayors, security forces, local government and administration to gather and share information on the poaching issue, create community solidarity around the poaching issue and make a public declaration that will be disseminated locally and by national media.		Completed in November 2015. Please refer to AR 2015-16.	
Activity 2.2. Ongoing monitoring of performance to assess take-up and identify further training needs.		Ongoing and under review. See reporting on output above.	
Activity 2.3. Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance.			
Activity 2.4. Trialling the Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic toolkit, and the CITES and EIA guides for enforcement officers to determine the best way for enforcement officers to make use of these tools.			
Output 3. Effective forester presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso	<p>3.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 provided to community brigades and foresters from the south of the elephant range and Burkina Faso (baseline=zero).</p> <p>3.2. Number of incidences of coordinated action (baseline=zero).</p>	<p>3.1. Completed in 2015 and maintained by two 2-day inter-communal meetings were held with the trans-frontier communities in May and September (attended by 145 people) to maintain support for elephant protection and CBNRM initiatives. Community leaders continued to voice their support for anti-poaching operations and denounced the poachers as thieves, calling for renewed efforts to restore security. In August and September 11 days of training were facilitated for eco-guardians from cross-border communities, including a 2-day training workshop for 58 participants from southern communities. The training focussed on how to monitor elephants and report poaching-related activities safely, discretely and effectively. In response to increased poaching in October, the 12 most capable and trustworthy eco-guardians from southern communities were trained to work with the APU for a 6 month period by monitoring elephant movements and reporting any poaching-related activity.</p> <p>3.2. Since the APU became fully operational in September, opportunities to interact with the trans-frontier communities have been limited because the elephants have mainly been located in the centre and north of the range, following their usual migratory pattern. However, the APU responded to intelligence that poachers had travelled to the Temberemt area (south-east of Hombori) from the direction of the Burkina-Faso border in September and December. Although the poachers were not encountered, the presence of the APU appeared to act as a deterrent. As the elephants move south these structures will continue to be supported in their efforts especially through the eco-guardians.</p>	
Activity 3.1. Meeting, training course and exchange to establish community-forester anti-poaching systems with cross-border co-operation and integration of		Completed in 2015.	

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Progress and Achievements: April 2016 - March 2017.	Actions required/planned for next period
poaching response. Not funded by IWTC funds.			
Activity 3.2. Follow-up meetings to assess progress, learn lessons. Not funded by IWTC funds.		Refer to output indicator 3.1 above. In addition to the two inter-communal meetings (4 days attended by 145 people) and 11 days of eco-guardian training, a large meeting of community leaders, government officials and DNEF representatives was facilitated by the project in January to introduce the APU the Gourma communities and explain that their mission is to protect the elephants, assist with NRM activities and contribute to the restoration of security.	
<i>[Output 4. All field foresters working with local communities throughout the elephant range in such activities as fire-break construction and patrol back-up. Removed through change request in 2016.]</i>			<i>[Removed through change request. Please refer to AR 2015-16.]</i>

Annex 2: Project’s full current logframe as presented in the application form (unless changes have been agreed)

N.B. if your application’s logframe is presented in a different format in your application, please transpose into the below template. Please feel free to contact IWT-Fund@ltsi.co.uk if you have any questions regarding this.

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Means of verification	Important Assumptions
<p>Impact: A reduction in elephant poaching, an increase in security, and poverty alleviation in the Gourma region of Mali.</p>			
<p>Outcome: Mali has an improved capacity to co-ordinate activities in tracking and tracing elephant poaching, bringing poachers to justice and enforcing poaching laws. This will halt the current escalation of poaching by severely impeding the operation of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking networks in Mali, and thereby maintain elephant numbers. The increased government capacity will feed in to support local systems of resource management that improve livelihoods and make space for elephants, while increasing security.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of elephant illegally killed and rate of increase/decrease in killings compared to existing rate, aiming for no further increase within the project period (baseline = 12 in six months) 2. Number of illegal killings for which the perpetrators are arrested, and brought to justice, the instigator identified and arrested, the trafficker identified, and the tusks recovered, in order to map out the existing trafficking network within the project period (baseline = 4 arrests and prosecutions in six months of individuals thought to be responsible for several killings; instigator, informant and suspected trafficker identified) 3. Extension of forester field presence – the creation and equipment of 10 additional forester posts throughout the elephant range 4. Development of a cross-border capacity for co-operation in anti-poaching operations. 5. Increased support to local communities in resource management (baseline = 1 per annum) 6. A reduction in number of hijackings and robberies 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. DNEF database containing information about all known poaching incidences, and project reports. 2. DNEF database, and government records of prosecutions containing information about all known poaching incidences, and project reports. 3. Existence of forester posts – photographs – and government reports. 4a. DNEF and project reports evaluating response to particular incidents; 4b. Protocole d'accord and the number of joint operations as enumerated in DNEF database and reports of the DNEF and project. 5. Project reports. 6. Records held by the gendarmerie and project; 	<p>Assumption 1. Increased enforcement capacity leads to reduced poaching incidences.</p> <p>Assumption 2. Mali remains committed to supporting the enforcement of its laws on poaching.</p> <p>Assumption 3. Trafficking networks can be deterred from targeting ivory.</p>

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Means of verification	Important Assumptions
<p>Output 1. DNEF field foresters able to work with local community brigades to mount anti-poaching patrols, respond to poaching incidences, collect and report required evidence.</p>	<p>1.1. Number of manned forester posts in the elephant range (baseline = 4; end point = 14).</p> <p>1.2. Number of foresters deployed throughout the elephant range (baseline = 4; endpoint = 30).</p> <p>1.3. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero).</p> <p>1.4. Number of incidences of poaching detected (baseline = 12 in six months), DNEF response mounted (baseline = 7 in six months), arrests follow (baseline = 7 in six months), information about instigator/trafficker obtained (baseline=7 in six months).</p>	<p>1.1. Reports; photos; map.</p> <p>1.2. Training reports and photos; operations reports.</p> <p>1.3. Training reports and photos.</p> <p>1.4. Database of poaching records and judicial progress held by DNEF and the project.</p>	<p>1. That civil war does not reoccur and government remains in the elephant range.</p> <p>2. That all levels of the DNEF remain committed to elephant protection.</p> <p>3. Greater capacity to respond prevents an increase poaching incidents.</p> <p>4. That DNEF contains staff turnover to ensure a corpus of personnel develop an elephant protection ethic that is strong enough to be transmitted to subsequent officers.</p>
<p>Output 2. DNEF at commune, cercle and regional levels able to support ground operations, deliver effective anti-poaching and trafficking operations, collect and keep required data.</p>	<p>2.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = zero).</p> <p>2.2. Number and percentage of poaching incidences that result in arrest in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline = 4, 33% in six months).</p> <p>2.3. Number and percentage of poaching incidences that result in prosecution in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (baseline=zero).</p>	<p>2.1. Training reports and photos.</p> <p>2.2. & 2.3. Database of poaching records and judicial progress held by DNEF and the project.</p>	<p>As above.</p>
<p>Output 3. Effective forester presence throughout the elephant range working in concert with homologues in Burkina Faso.</p>	<p>3.1. Number of weeks training in 2015, 2016 and 2017 provided to community brigades and foresters from the south of the elephant range and Burkina Faso (baseline=zero)</p> <p>3.2. Number of incidences of coordinated action (baseline=zero).</p>	<p>3.1. Training reports and photos.</p> <p>3.2. Incident reports.</p>	<p>As above.</p>
<p>Activities (each activity is numbered according to the output that it will contribute towards, for example 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are contributing to Output 1)</p> <p>1.1. Construction, equipment and establishment of 10 additional forester posts.</p> <p>1.2. Deployment of 2 vehicles plus protocols of use and responsibility, under the control of the project's field manager working in conjunction with the chefs de service.</p>			

Project summary	Measurable Indicators	Means of verification	Important Assumptions
<p>Activity 1.3. Installation of a military state-of-the-art secured radio-communications system in the most vulnerable parts of the elephant range.</p> <p>1.4. Training course and field visit to Nazinga Game Ranch in Burkina Faso for field foresters in anti-poaching procedures.</p> <p>1.5. Training of field foresters in working with local communities as part of community activities and ongoing monitoring of performance.</p> <p>1.6. Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance.</p> <p>2.1. Two large community meetings (one for each cercle) of all the mayors, security forces, local government and administration to gather and share information on the poaching issue, create community solidarity around the poaching issue and make a public declaration that will be disseminated locally and by national media.</p> <p>2.3. Subsequent training courses in 2016 and 2017 based on needs assessed through ongoing monitoring of performance.</p> <p>2.4. Trialling the Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic toolkit, and the CITES and EIA guides for enforcement officers to determine the best way for enforcement officers to make use of these tools.</p> <p>3.1. Meeting, training course and exchange to establish community-forester anti-poaching systems with cross-border co-operation and integration of poaching response.</p> <p>3.2. Follow-up meetings to assess progress, learn lessons.</p>			

Annex 3 Standard Measures

Annex 4 Onwards – supplementary material (optional but encouraged as evidence of project achievement)

Checklist for submission

	Check
Is the report less than 10MB? If so, please email to IWT-Fund@ltsi.co.uk putting the project number in the subject line.	√
Is your report more than 10MB? If so, please discuss with IWT-Fund@ltsi.co.uk about the best way to deliver the report, putting the project number in the subject line.	N/A
Have you included means of verification? You need not submit every project document, but the main outputs and a selection of the others would strengthen the report.	√
Do you have hard copies of material you want to submit with the report? If so, please make this clear in the covering email and ensure all material is marked with the project number.	N/A
Have you involved your partners in preparation of the report and named the main contributors	√
Have you completed the Project Expenditure table fully?	√
Do not include claim forms or other communications with this report.	